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We investigate the impact of misinformation about the contact structure on the ability to predict disease
outbreaks. We base our study on 31 empirical temporal networks and tune the frequencies in errors in the node
identities or timestamps of contacts. We find that for both these spreading scenarios, the maximal misprediction
of both the outbreak size and time to extinction follows an stretched exponential convergence as a function of the
error frequency. We furthermore determine the temporal-network structural factors influencing the parameters
of this convergence.
I. INTRODUCTION
Infectious diseases are a major burden to global health.
They spread over temporal networks of human contacts [3,
32, 33, 42]. The structures of such networks affect the dynam-
ics of disease, so to be able to mitigate outbreaks, we need to
understand how this happens [1, 10, 12, 26]. With new data
sources people have been able to map human contact patters
to a much greater precision than ever before [9, 23, 31, 45–
47, 49]. There is a growing body of literature using such
proximity networks as the underlying structure for simula-
tions of disease spreading [17, 22, 32, 33, 45]. Typical re-
search questions concern: How to exploit the temporal infor-
mation in vaccination campaigns [9, 30]. How to identify hot-
spots for disease spreading in animal trade [2]. How to reduce
temporal networks to static networks as accurately as possi-
ble for static-network modeling of disease spreading [14]. As
with all empirical data, the proximity network these studies
are based on come with inaccuracies. These affect the pre-
dictions from simulation studies using them as a substrate. In
this work, we investigate the impact of such inaccuracies. We
compare outbreak predictions in the presence of misinforma-
tion, or noise, both in the topological information (who is in
contact with whom) and the temporal information (when these
contacts happen).
This work is based on simulations of the susceptible-
infected-recovered (SIR) model. This is the canonical model
for emerging disease outbreaks of pathogens making the in-
fected immune upon recovery. We will assume the contagion
can happen during contacts of temporal networks. We use
31 empirical networks as our input. These have different de-
gree of relevance for modeling disease spreading. Some of
them records people being in close proximity and thus in dan-
ger of spreading e.g. influenza. We also use some other data
sets from social media, that of course are less realistic as sub-
strates for disease propagation, but are related to the spread
of information. An alternative approach would be to use gen-
erative models where the temporal network structure can be
controlled. This would have the advantage that one can sys-
tematically control one structure, but the drawback that one
would have to focus on certain structures (like the time be-
tween events [35]). At the time of writing, it is not completely
known what temporal network structures that are the most im-
portant for disease spreading [18]. So instead of building a
model upon guesses about that, we use empirical networks,
which makes it possible to study both how the sensitivity to
noise depends on temporal network structure and the empiri-
cal networks per se. This approach also enables us to discover
common features and fluctuations in the contact data sets.
In our simulations, we scan the entire parameter space of
the SIR model. (For temporal networks, the parameter space
is two-dimensional, unlike for static network epidemiology
where the qualitative behavior is determined by only one pa-
rameter.) We compare these disease simulations for the em-
pirical networks with the same type of simulation on networks
where the identities of the nodes and the time of the contacts
have been altered randomly to mimic errors in the data. Then
we proceed to measure the largest deviation between the pre-
dictions about the time to extinction and the number of af-
fected nodes in the outbreaks. Finally, we try to relate the
magnitude of these deviations to the temporal network struc-
ture of the data.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we will go through some technicalities of
our simulation study.
A. Definitions
We represent a temporal network G as contact sequence—a
list of triples (i, j, t) recording a contact between i and j at time
t [17, 22]. We call a pair of nodes with at least one contact
a link. We use N and C to represent the number of nodes
and contacts, while T represents the duration of the temporal
network (the time between the first and last contact). Without
loss of generality, we can identify the nodes with numbers in
the interval [1,N].
B. Contact networks
As motivated in the Introduction, we base our study on em-
pirical temporal networks. The first class of such networks—
and the one most relevant to disease spreading—is human
proximity networks. These are data sets that capture when two
2TABLE I: Basic statistics of the empirical temporal networks. N is the number of individuals; C is the number of contacts; T is the total
sampling time; ∆t is the time resolution of the data set and M is the number of links in the projected static networks.
Data set N C T ∆t M Ref.
Conference 113 20, 818 2.50d 20s 2, 196 [23]
Hospital 75 32, 424 96.5h 20s 1, 139 [49]
Office 92 9, 827 11.4d 20s 755 [9]
Primary School 1 236 60, 623 8.64h 20s 5, 901 [46]
Primary School 2 238 65, 150 8.58h 20s 5, 541 [46]
High School 1 312 28, 780 4.99h 20s 2, 242 [31]
High School 2 310 47, 338 8.99h 20s 2, 573 [31]
High School 3 303 40, 174 8.99h 20s 2, 161 [31]
High School 4 295 37, 279 8.99h 20s 2, 162 [31]
High School 5 299 34, 937 8.99h 20s 2, 075 [31]
Gallery 1 200 5, 943 7.80h 20s 714 [48]
Gallery 2 204 6, 709 8.05h 20s 739 [48]
Gallery 3 186 5, 691 7.39h 20s 615 [48]
Gallery 4 211 7, 409 8.01h 20s 563 [48]
Gallery 5 215 7, 634 5.61h 20s 967 [48]
Reality 64 26, 260 8.63h 5s 722 [6]
Romania 42 1, 748, 401 62.8d 1m 256 [41]
Kenya 52 2, 070 61h 1h 86 [27]
Diary 49 2, 143 418d 1d 345 [42]
Prostitution 16, 730 50, 632 6.00y 1d 39, 044 [44]
WiFi 18, 719 9, 094, 619 83.7d 5m 884, 800 [52]
UK 25 408, 996 74d 1s 139 [5]
Messages 35, 624 489, 653 3, 018d 1s 94, 768 [24]
Forum 7, 084 1, 429, 573 3, 141d 1s 138, 144 [24]
Dating 29, 341 529, 890 512d 1s 115, 684 [19]
College 1, 899 59, 835 193d 1s 13, 838 [39]
Facebook 45, 813 855, 542 1, 561d 1s 183, 412 [50]
E-mail 1 57, 194 444, 160 112d 1s 92, 442 [7]
E-mail 2 3, 188 309, 125 81d 1s 31, 857 [8]
E-mail 3 986 332, 334 526d 1s 16, 064 [40]
E-mail 4 167 82, 927 271d 1s 3, 251 [34]
persons are in close proximity. Many of these data sets come
from the Sociopatterns project (sociopatterns.org). These net-
works are based on people wearing radio-frequency identifi-
cation sensors that detect contacts between people within 1–
1.5 m. One of these datasets comes from a conference [23]
(Conference), another from a school (Primary School) [46],
a third from a hospital (Hospital) [49], a fourth from an art
gallery (Gallery) [48], a fifth from office (Office) [9], and a
sixth from members of five families in rural Kenya [27]. The
Gallery data sets consists of several days where we use the
first five. Yet a data set Reality was gathered using the Blue-
tooth channel of the phones of college students [6]. In Ro-
mania, the WiFi channel of smartphones was used to log the
proximity between university students [41]. UK is another
similar dataset of the proximity of university students from
wearable sensors [5]. The final proximity data, the Prostitu-
tion network, comes from from self-reported sexual contacts
between female sex-workers and their male clients [44]. This
is a special form of proximity network since the contacts rep-
resent more than just proximity (i.e. sexual contacts).
In addition to the proximity networks, we also study net-
works from electronic communication. Facebook comes from
the wall posts at the social media platform Facebook [50].
College records the network of communication at a Facebook-
like service [39]. Dating gives the interaction at an early Inter-
net dating website [19]. Messages and Forum are records of
user interaction at a film community [24]. Finally we use two
data sets of e-mail communication. One, E-mail 1, recording
all e-mails to and from a set of sampled accounts [7]. The
other three, E-mail 2 [8], 3 [40], and 4 [34] recording e-mails
within a set of sampled accounts. We list basic statistics—
sizes, sampling durations, etc.—of all the data sets in Table I.
C. Epidemic simulation
There are a few different ways to simulate SIR dynamics
on temporal networks. We use the following approach. First,
we set all individuals to S (susceptible). Then, we randomly
choose one node i0 ∈ [1,N] and one time t0 ∈ [0,T ) and
change i0 from S to I at time t0. Then we go through the
contacts temporal network by order of their time stamp. If a
contact connects a susceptible and an infected node, the sus-
ceptible can become infected with probability λ. An infec-
tious stays infectious δ time steps before becoming recovered.
When there are no infectious individuals and time is later than
3t0 the outbreak is considered extinct. Note that this definition
is slightly different from the more common one [12] (where
an infectious individual have the same chance of getting well
every time step), but could be motivated by being algorithmi-
cally simpler [16] and not less realistic [28]. We characterize
an outbreak by the time to extinction τT and the average out-
break size ΩN. τ and Ω are thus quantities normalized to the
interval [0, 1]. For every temporal network, we average over
105 runs of the disease simulation.
D. Controlling misinformation
To model errors in the temporal information, we replace the
time stamps of a fraction T of the contacts of G by random
times in the interval [1,T ]. Similarly, for investigating the re-
sponse to the information about node identities, we replace a
randomly selected fraction N of the node id-numbers by ran-
dom numbers in the interval [1,N]. The only two constraints
we impose in these randomization schemes is that the result-
ing contacts should not introduce multiple links or self-links.
If a generated node-id number does not satisfy the constraint,
we redraw it. We do not study misinformation in both time
and node identities—if T > 0 then N = 0 and vice versa.
Technically, this approach is similar to randomization tech-
niques [13, 25] where the temporal network structure is inves-
tigated by systematically randomizing away some structure—
like the order of contacts—and studying the response to quan-
tities characterizing the functionality of the network (like Ω,
τ, etc.). The difference is that we tune the randomization via
 to monitor the response.
E. Measuring sensitivity to misinformation
We use two quantities to characterize the severity of an out-
break: the average final outbreak size Ω—the fraction of the
population that are R after the outbreak—and the extinction
time τ—the time from the first to the last infected individual
in the population. Let
∆(, λ, δ) = 〈Ω(G , λ, δ)〉 −Ω(G, λ, δ), (1)
where 〈 · 〉 denotes the average over an ensemble of networks
G in which a fraction  of misinformation has been imposed
to the node identities and G is the original network. Analo-
gously, we define ∆Ω for the deviation of outbreak sizes.
To study the response of ∆ to noise across the SIR parame-
ter space, we use the maximal deviation
ω() = max
[
max
δ,λ
∆(, δ, λ),−min
δ,λ
∆(, δ, λ)
]
, (2)
where ∆ can represent both ∆Ω and ∆τ. Furthermore, we drop
the N or T subscripts of ω and . With a specific disease and a
specific network in mind, one should of course investigate its
feasible region of the λ, δ space.
F. Network descriptors
How much misinformation impacts prediction of Ω and τ
depends in the the structure of the temporal networks. To un-
derstand this, we consider 48 quantities, or network descrip-
tors. Refs. [18, 21] use a similar approach but a different set
of measures.
1. Long-term activity
A first type of network descriptors characterizes the long-
term activity of the data—about if the overall activity is con-
stant throughout the sampling time, if the links are active
throughout the sampling period, etc. xnT and xlT show how
large fraction of the nodes and links, respectively, that are
present at half the duration of the data. In a situation where
individuals are participating in contacts already early in the
data, xnT will be small. It will be large if nodes enter the
data throughout the sampling period. Analogously, xlT will
be small if the contacts between all nodes that have at least
one contact happen early in the sampling period. Some of the
data sets have a more intense activity at the end of the sam-
pling period. To compensate for this, we also measure xnC
and xlC—the corresponding quantities to xnT and xlT but mea-
sured at the time half of the contacts have been observed. A
fifth final measure of this type is xC—the fraction of contacts
observed at half the sampling time. In a data set with a grow-
ing level of activity, this quantity would be less than 1/2.
2. Durations of nodes and links
Our second type of network descriptors relate to the life-
span of nodes and links in the data. We start from the set
of durations of nodes (links) presence in the data (normalized
by T ), i.e. the time between the first and last contact a node
(link) participates in. Then we use four summary statistics to
describe these sets—the mean µdn (µ
d
l ), standard deviation σ
d
n
(σdl ), coefficient of variation v
d
n = σ
d
n/µ
d
n (v
d
l = σ
d
l /µ
d
l ) and
finally the skewness γdn (γ
d
l ). γ = µ3/µ
3/2
2 where µ2 and µ3 are
the second and third moments of the distribution, respectively.
A long enough temporal network where most of the nodes are
present throughout the duration of the data, the average µdn
would be relatively large.
3. Inter-event times of nodes and links
The times between contacts for individual nodes and links
are called inter-event times. These are known to be broadly
distributed [11] which (if it is the only temporal structure
present) tend to slow down spreading phenomena [35], at least
at an early stage of an outbreak [43]. We use the same sum-
mary statistics as for the duration of nodes and links—i.e. the
mean µin (µ
i
l), standard deviation σ
i
n (σ
i
l), coefficient of varia-
tion vin (v
i
l)—called burstiness in Ref. [11]—and skewness γ
i
n
4(γil).
4. Nodes and links activity
We also study the overall activity in the data—the total
number of contacts—of nodes and links. From the sequence
of numbers of contacts we calculate the same four sum-
mary statistics as for inter-event times and durations. Note
that the node and links activities is sometimes referred to as
“strength” [38].
5. Static network structures
So far, the quantities mentioned have all concerned tempo-
ral aspects of the data in one way or another. We also measure
some properties of static networks derived from the contacts.
There are several ways to reduce the contacts of a temporal
network to a static network [14]. We use two simple methods.
First, we consider the network of links between pairs of nodes
that have at least one contact in the data. Second, we construct
a reduced network of pairs of nodes with at least n contacts,
where n is chosen as large as possible with the constraint that
the size of the largest connected component should be at least
a fraction α of its original size. We use α = 0.8—one do not
want it so small that the network is completely fragmented,
and not so large that the network is just the same as the net-
work of all links (that we anyway also consider).
For both the two above types of static networks, we mea-
sure two classes of network quantities. First, those related
to the degree distribution (the same four characterizing the
inter-event time and duration distributions—mean, standard
deviation, coefficient of variation and skewness). Second, we
measure three classic network quantities—the degree assorta-
tivity, the clustering coefficient and the number of connected
components. The degree assortativity is roughly speaking the
Pearson correlation of the degree of the nodes connected by
a link. Thus it measures the tendency for high-degree nodes
to form links with other high-degree nodes, and low-degree
to low-degree nodes. The clustering coefficient measures the
fraction of triangles to the numbers of triples of nodes con-
nected by either two or three links. For an introduction to
these types of measures, see text books like Refs. [4, 36].
G. System sizes and summary
As a final category of temporal network structural measures
we will also use the systems sizes—the number of nodes, con-
tacts and links (pairs of nodes having at least one contact).
All together, we have twelve categories of network structural
measures: long-term activity (with five measures), inter-event
times, activities and durations of nodes and links (each with
four measures), degree distributions and other network quan-
tities for the full static network and the reduced network (each
with four measures), and the above-mentioned system sizes
(three measures).
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FIG. 1: Panel (a) shows the deviation of the predicted extinction time
∆τ for the E-mail 4 data set and node-identity error frequencies N =
0.001, 0.01, 0.1 and 1 respectively. Panel (b) shows how the location
of the maximal ∆τ in the SIR parameter space depends on the node
error rate.
III. RESULTS
A. Example of the impact of node identity misinformation
Turning to our numerical results, we first investigate the re-
sponse to errors in the node identities for the E-mail 4 data
set. (We choose this data set because it is of typical size and
has all features we need to discuss below.) In Fig. 1(a), we
show the deviation ∆τ(N , λ, δ) for an exponential progression
of N-values—N = 10−3, 10−2, 10−1, 1—and the SIR parame-
ters λ and δ.
As seen in Fig. 1(a), the response to the misinformation
is nonlinear as functions of both , λ and δ. For  = 10−3,
the impact ∆τ is less than 0.1 throughout the λ, δ-space. For
 = 10−2, ∆τ reaches values around 0.1, while for larger N-
values, ∆τ is larger than 0.1, or lower than −0.1 for a large part
of parameter space. The shape of the region of large ∆τ also
changes with N . For N ≥ 0.1 there are points with negative
∆τ. This region expands with N originating from the large
λ, δ limit. Fig. 1(b) shows how the parameter values λ∗ and
δ∗ maximizing ∆τ changes with N . Indeed, neither of these
quantities are constant—λ∗ and δ∗ decreases (λ∗ much faster
and more than δ∗). For most of the data sets, and both errors in
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FIG. 2: ∆τ (the deviation of the predicted extinction time) for all data sets as a function of the SIR parameter values (per-contact transmission
probability λ and disease duration δ normalized by the total sampling time T ). These plots show data for node-identity errors at a level N = 0.1.
The shaded area indicate the data sets of human proximity, the others come from social media and digital communication.
time and node identities, λ∗ and δ∗ is either constant or mostly
decreasing—occasionally there can be local peaks but no in-
creasing trend (plots not shown). To sketch an explanation for
this behavior, first note that both randomizing time and net-
work topology, with very few exceptions, facilitates spread-
ing [18]. These phenomena have usually been attributed to
heterogeneous distributions of inter-event times [25] or net-
work clustering [51] respectively. Tuning up the error rates
makes these phenomena increasingly strong. For small λ and
δ this means that the outbreak is more likely not to die out
early and take hold in the population. This continues until a
point where ∆Ω and ∆τ reaches their maxima after which ∆τ
decreases to negative values as the faster spreading makes the
outbreak burn out fast in the population. For some data sets
this peak happens close to λ = 1, but for others it leads to a
peak [15].
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FIG. 3: ∆Ω (the deviation of the predicted outbreak size) for all data sets as a function of the SIR parameter values. The node-identity
misinformation is N = 0.1. The shaded area indicate the human proximity data.
B. SIR parameter dependence of ∆
Now we will continue the analysis of ∆Ω and ∆τ on all the
data sets and one value of the error frequency—N = T = 0.1.
In Figs. 2 and 3, we show ∆τ and ∆Ω respectively for errors in
node identities. We will not discuss every feature of these heat
maps—just the most conspicuous—but also believe they give
a feeling for the complexity, variability and universal features
present in the data.
In general, the largest deviations happen for ∆Ω. ∆Ω can
reach up to ∆Ω = 0.75 (see Fig. 3). In this sense, prediction
of outbreak sizes is more affected by topological misinforma-
tion than prediction of extinction times. The parameter depen-
dence of ∆τ falls into three distinct categories: a region of neg-
ative values at the region of large λ and δ (Conference, Hospi-
tal, Office, Primary School, High School, Kenya, Diary, WiFi,
Forum and E-mail 1, 2 and 3); only a region of negative values
at large δ (Romania and UK); and only a region of positive val-
ues (Gallery, Facebook, College and E-mail 1). Looking for
possible structural explanations, Romania and UK are the data
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FIG. 4: Plots corresponding to Fig. 2 but for time-stamp errors at a level T = 0.1.
sets with highest number of contacts per node, while the latter
group (including the Gallery data) develop very slowly—this
group e.g. tops the list of small xnC and xlC values. For large δ,
outbreaks are likely to burn out in the population, for datasets
with many contacts per link this can happen also for quite low
λ. Without misinformation there are typically new nodes com-
ing into the data continuously which makes the outbreak last
to the end of the sampling time, even though all nodes are af-
fected. For the data sets with enough contacts per node, iden-
tity noise will make all nodes appear relatively early in the
temporal network which will make the entire outbreak ending
earlier, thus the pattern of Romania and UK in Fig. 3. The
phenomenon that low-xnC-xlC networks have only positive ∆τ
can be understood since low xnC implies a big overturn of in-
dividuals. With a relatively high chance, the seed node would
already have left the data by the time it gets infected which
lowers Ω. Node identity errors helps mixing the nodes in the
time dimension too, which diminishes this effect and increases
the positive term of Eq. 1.
The picture one gets from ∆Ω (Fig. 3) is slightly different
from that of ∆τ (Fig. 2). First ∆Ω is non-negative, meaning
that for no amount of noise, or location in the parameter space,
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FIG. 5: Plots corresponding to Fig. 3 but for time-stamp errors at a level T = 0.1.
Ω smaller than its original value. Node-identity noise thus al-
ways leads to an overestimation of the outbreak size. The sec-
ond observation is that the peak of ∆Ω is always at λ = 1. Ω
is strictly increasing (both with and without misinformation),
so it is not surprising that their difference also peaks at λ = 1.
Other than that, some patterns of Fig. 3 occurs in Fig. 2 too—
the very dense Romania has large ∆Ω deviations for low δ
values while for large δ, Ω is close to one for both the original
and noisy networks (i.e. ∆Ω is small).
In Figs. 4 and 5, we plot the corresponding quantities to
Figs. 2 and 3 but for noise in the time stamps rather than node
identities. In Fig. 4, some data sets (Conference, Hospital,
Office, Primary School 1 and 2, High School 2, Reality, Ro-
mania, WiFi, UK and E-mail 2) have both regions of positive
and negative ∆τ. WiFi is different in that the region of negative
∆τ lies below (lower δ) the region of positive ∆τ. Compared
to Fig. 2 the data set Diary is somewhat different in that it has
∆τ ≈ 0 for errors in node identities but quite large ∆ values for
errors in the time stamps. In some of our network descriptors
Diary is extreme—it has the largest, or second largest, values
of all the long-term activity quantities; it also has among the
smallest values of the node and link inter-event-time bursti-
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FIG. 6: ωΩ—the difference between the largest and smallest ∆Ω
values—for the E-mail 4 data set over the SIR parameter space as
a function of the error frequencies N (a) and T (b) for errors in
node and time information, respectively. The curves are Levenberg–
Marquardt fits to a stretched exponential form, ω∞[1 − exp(−ab)].
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FIG. 7: Box-and-whiskers plot of the fitting parameters b and ω∞.
The box represents the region of one standard deviation. The other
lines are the maximum, average and minimum respectively. b is the
stretching exponent; ω∞ is the final value (in the limit of large errors).
ness. A node with small burstiness has relatively more uni-
formly spaced contacts. This mechanism is known to speed up
spreading dynamics [25]. Changing the node identities appar-
ently affect these issues even more, otherwise expected, that
in our paper from [0.01, 0.10].
As seen in Fig. 5, ∆Ω does not become negative when there
are errors in the time of contacts either—no matter what the
misinformation contains it always makes the predicted out-
breaks larger. In a few cases however ∆Ω is very low and
close to zero (e.g. Gallery 1–5, Prostitution, Email 1). The
overall impression is similar to Fig. 3, but for example Forum
is different with large ∆Ω values for the node-identity errors
but very small for time-stamp errors. Forum is however not
extreme in any of the structural measures that we use—it is
one of the largest (in number of nodes, links and contacts) and
one where the activity increases in the sense that xnT and xlT
are among the smallest (then again Facebook has even lower
xnT and xlT but also smaller ∆Ω).
To sum up our results of the SIR parameter dependencies
of the deviations ∆τ and ∆Ω, there are some clear patterns,
like the data sets sampled in the same way (Primary School,
High School and Gallery) are always showing the same pat-
terns. On the other hand, the two major classes of data sets
sampled—proximity networks and electronic communication
do not show any consistent patterns. While authors have ar-
gued that social networks have a different structure than other
networks [37], we cannot say the same for these two classes.
C. Impact of error rate on prediction deviations
To better understand the response of the level of misinfor-
mation on the prediction accuracy, we study ω()—the max-
imum absolute value of ∆τ or ∆Ω-values (see Eq. (2)). We
searched for a functional form that can summarize the -
dependence of ω—not necessarily the best statistical model
in a model selection sense, but a function that fit all mis-
information scenarios. We found a stretched exponential
convergence—
ω˜() = ω∞
[
1 − exp(−ab)
]
, (3)
where a and b are fitting parameters—to meet this condition
very well. None of the scenarios for any of the networks has
a reduced χ2 value larger than 1 (it ranges from 5.3× 10−8 for
Kenya ωΩ of time errors to 0.24 for the ωτ of node identity
errors of E-mail 1). The parameter b (typically in the interval
0 < b < 1) is called the stretching exponent and its deviation
from unity indicates how much the tail is stretched compared
to an exponential decay [29]. An example of this behavior—
neither the best, nor the worst fit—can be seen in Fig. 6 (for
the E-mail 4 dataset—the same example as in Fig. 1).
As far as we understand, there is no straightforward expla-
nation for this functional form. Rather, we believe that in gen-
eral the ω()-curves can deviate from stretched exponentials.
Indeed, the points that are off the fitting curves (e.g. the point
ωτ(N = 0.004)) are probably not a result of bad convergence,
but structures in the data sets. The three fitting parameters
of Eq. 3 are nevertheless concise ways of summarizing the
shapes of the ω() dependence and a way of relating temporal
network structure and the error response of epidemic predic-
tions.
As alluded to, the perhaps most interesting parameter of
the stretched exponential fits is the stretching exponent b. If
b = 1, the convergence is exponential. If b < 1, the decay is
stretched (or slower than exponential). In Fig. 7, we present
the values for our eight analyses (we refer to them as “cases”
below)—b or ω∞, node-identity or time-stamp misinforma-
tion, or prediction of τ or Ω. It is almost the case for all
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TABLE II: Coefficient of determination R2 and p-values of the multiple regression analysis of the relationship between the parameters describ-
ing ω() and network structural quantities. Stars represent three levels of significance (∗∗∗ means p < 0.001, ∗∗ means 0.001 ≤ p < 0.01 and ∗
means 0.01 ≤ p < 0.05) and the absence of stars means p ≥ 0.05.
Structure Nτ NΩ Tτ TΩ
b ω∞ b ω∞ b ω∞ b ω∞
Long-term activity 0.17 0.22 0.13 0.13 0.15 0.04 0.34∗ 0.24
Node inter-event times 0.25 0.67∗∗∗ 0.67∗∗∗ 0.03 0.22 0.01 0.38 0.08
Node duration 0.16 0.04 0.07 0.60∗∗∗ 0.26 0.01 0.33∗ 0.25
Node activity 0.20 0.75∗∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗ 0.50∗∗ 0.30 0.02 0.44∗∗ 0.18
Link inter-event times 0.26 0.41∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗ 0.02 0.23 0.01 0.39∗∗ 0.05
Link duration 0.13 0.06 0.10 0.13 0.24 0.02 0.22 0.25
Link activity 0.22 0.76∗∗∗ 0.66∗∗∗ 0.36 0.21 0.14 0.35∗ 0.14
Full nwk. deg. dist. 0.22 0.04 0.07 0.82∗∗∗ 0.33∗ 0.26 0.10 0.15
Full nwk. structure 0.27 0.16 0.24 0.23 0.27 0.12 0.38∗ 0.31∗
Red. nwk. deg. dist. 0.05 0.08 0.07 0.81∗∗∗ 0.13 0.18 0.24 0.24
Red. nwk. structure 0.08 0.30∗ 0.23 0.16 0.26 0.18 0.33∗ 0.19
System sizes 0.17 0.12 0.53∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗ 0.32 0.01 0.42∗∗ 0.19
misinformation scenarios and data sets that 0 < b < 1 (the
maximal observed b-value is 1.2). Otherwise, we note that
there is a fairly large spread of b, and that it is quite similar
for all combinations of outbreak descriptor (τ or Ω) and mis-
information type. ω∞ is bounded to [0, 1] and does indeed
take values in the entire range. The average ω∞ node-identity
misinformation and ∆τ is larger than the others which is also
hinted from Figs. 2–5.
As a final analysis, we seek to understand the values of the
fitting parameters b and ω∞ for the individual data sets (not
only the summary statistics of Fig. 7). We will once again
look for explanations in our network descriptors. To do this in
a systematic way, we perform an independent multiple regres-
sion analysis for each structural category listed in Section II F
(quantities related to the long-term activity, the node inter-
event time, etc.). We fit a linear model of the variables of each
category to the b and ω∞ values. To keep the analysis simple
we do not include interaction variables (that would be interest-
ing for the future). Table II shows the R2 values (coefficients
of determination) of the regression analysis for each combina-
tion of parameters b (or w∞) and scenarios/measures of mis-
information, i.e. Nτ (node-identities and extinction time), NΩ
(node-identities and outbreak size), Tτ (time-stamps and ex-
tinction time) and NΩ (time-stamps and outbreak size). It also
marks the p-values (giving significance levels) of the hypoth-
esis that there is no correlation between the temporal network
structure and b (or w∞).
This analysis shows that none of our classes of temporal-
network quantities we are investigating is a very strong pre-
dictor of the deviations—R2 is never very close to 1. On the
other hand, there is nothing else than the temporal network
structure that affects the outbreaks, so we cannot conclude the
study of network-structural causes of the sensitivity to misin-
formation. On the other hand, there are statistically signifi-
cant correlations, and they depend on the quantity to be pre-
dicted and the misinformation scenarios. Three cases can be
well-described by the data—ω∞ for the extinction time mea-
surements with node-identity misinformation (Nτ) and both
b and ω∞ for the outbreak sizes of the same misinformation
scenario (NΩ). In all of these cases, the node activity distri-
butions is a strong predictor. Node and link inter-event times
are also important factors determining b for the NΩ case and
ω∞ for Nτ. For ω∞ and NΩ, the degree distributions and sys-
tem sizes seem more important. It is hard to have some fur-
ther intuition in why different responses to misinformation is
differently affected by temporal-network structure. There is,
seemingly, no intermediate connection between temporal de-
scriptors (like inter-event times) and temporal misinformation,
or our temporal outbreak characteristic (the extinction time).
IV. DISCUSSION
We have studied the effects of misinformation in contact
data on the predictability of epidemics by the SIR model. We
find a complex situation where both misinformation in time
stamps and node identities affect the prediction of both out-
break sizes and times to extinction in fairly similar orders of
magnitude. The maximal deviation between predictions from
the original and erroneous data follows a stretched exponen-
tial convergence as a function of the error frequency.
The variation of our results across data sets are very large,
but the parameter dependence fall into classes that can be un-
derstood to some extent from the particular way they were
sampled. For the proximity networks, the definition of con-
tacts naturally affects the density of contacts. We did not try to
normalize the datasets as this can be done by adjusting the SIR
parameters. For the future, it would be interesting to know if
the results could be rescaled to collapse the deviation heat-
maps (e.g. Fig. 2).
We, furthermore, examine what kind of simple temporal-
network quantities that controls the response to misinforma-
tion. We find that this question depends on the type of mis-
information and the type of prediction. For example, the
stretching exponent of how the maximal deviation of outbreak
sizes depend on the frequency of node-identity errors is influ-
enced by the node and link inter-event time distributions. (The
stretching exponent is positively correlated with the mean and
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standard deviation of the inter-event times, but negatively cor-
related with the coefficient of variation and skewness.) In gen-
eral, inter-event times and degree distributions seem more in-
fluential than the long-term time activity of the data sets.
More generally speaking than the response to misinforma-
tion, what temporal structures that are the most important de-
terminants for disease spreading in temporal networks is cur-
rently a matter of debate. Ref. [18] compares three levels
of representing contact networks (temporal, static and fully-
connected networks) and argues that the long-term time activ-
ity best explains how well SIR disease prediction on these rep-
resentations match. It is hard to compare to our results since
at no parameter values do our randomization not match the
representations that Ref. [18] is comparing. Is is possible that
long-term time activity is more important for what represen-
tation to choose, while other structures dominate the response
to misinformation. Furthermore, Ref. [20] shows that when
coarse graining a temporal network, keeping the underlying
network fixed, it is more important to keep the time evolution
than the inter-event times. As both node-identity and time-
stamp misinformation affects both the inter-event times and
the long-term activity, this is still consistent with our work.
Still, it is remarkable that it seems like not some types of
temporal network structure that we test seem to have more
explanatory power than others—they all seem to matter but
different ones being more important for different issues. The
most important conclusion is that it can be deceiving to rely
on models tuning simple temporal-network structures, say the
degree distribution, to evaluate intervention methods (like net-
work vaccination, etc.)—it is simply hard to say what struc-
ture that matters in what situation.
The quest for understanding how temporal-network struc-
ture influences disease spreading continues. One interesting
extension of the approach in this paper would be to—rather
than looking at global quantities such as ω, ∆τ, etc., to look at
different nodes or regions of the same data and the behavior of
these. If one changes the contact patterns of individual nodes
or clusters, how does that change the disease propagation?
[1] R. M. Anderson and R. M. May. Infectious diseases in humans.
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1992.
[2] P. Bajardi, A. Barrat, F. Natale, L. Savini, and V. Colizza.
Dynamical patterns of cattle trade movements. PLOS ONE,
6:e19869, 2011.
[3] S. Bansal, J. Read, B. Pourbohloul, and L. A. Meyers. The
dynamic nature of contact networks in infectious disease epi-
demiology. Journal of Biological Dynamics, 4:478–489, 2010.
[4] A.-L. Baraba´si. Network Science. Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge UK, 2015.
[5] G. Bigwood, T. Henderson, D. Rehunathan, M. Bateman, and
S. Bhatti. CRAWDAD dataset st andrews/sassy (v. 2011-06-
03). Downloaded from http://crawdad.org/st_andrews/
sassy/20110603/mobile, June 2011.
[6] N. Eagle and A. S. Pentland. Reality mining: sensing com-
plex social systems. Personal and Ubiquitous Computing,
10(4):255–268, 2006.
[7] H. Ebel, L.-I. Mielsch, and S. Bornholdt. Scale-free topology
of e-mail networks. Phys. Rev. E, 66:035103, 2002.
[8] J.-P. Eckmann, E. Moses, and D. Sergi. Entropy of dialogues
creates coherent structures in e-mail traffic. Proc. Natl. Acad.
Sci. USA, 101:14333–14337, 2004.
[9] M. Ge´nois, C. L. Vestergaard, J. Fournet, A. Panisson, I. Bon-
marin, and A. Barrat. Data on face-to-face contacts in an office
building suggest a low-cost vaccination strategy based on com-
munity linkers. Network Science, 3:326–347, 9 2015.
[10] J. Giesecke. Modern Infectious Disease Epidemiology. Arnold,
London, 2 edition, 2002.
[11] K.-I. Goh and A.-L. Baraba´si. Burstiness and memory in com-
plex systems. EPL (Europhysics Letters), 81(4):48002, 2008.
[12] H. W. Hethcote. The mathematics of infectious diseases. SIAM
Rev., 32(4):599–653, 2000.
[13] P. Holme. Network reachability of real-world contact se-
quences. Phys. Rev. E, 71(4):046119, 2005.
[14] P. Holme. Epidemiologically optimal static networks from tem-
poral network data. PLoS Comput. Biol., 9:e1003142, 2013.
[15] P. Holme. Extinction times of epidemic outbreaks in networks.
PLoS ONE, 8:e84429, 2013.
[16] P. Holme. Model versions and fast algorithms for network epi-
demiology. Journal of Logistical Engineering University, 5:51–
56, 2014.
[17] P. Holme. Modern temporal network theory: a colloquium. The
European Physical Journal B, 88(9):1–30, 2015.
[18] P. Holme. Temporal network structures controlling disease
spreading. Phys. Rev. E, 64:022305, 2016.
[19] P. Holme, C. R. Edling, and F. Liljeros. Structure and time
evolution of an Internet dating community. Social Networks,
26:155–174, 2004.
[20] P. Holme and F. Liljeros. Birth and death of links control dis-
ease spreading in empirical contact networks. Scientific Re-
ports, 4:4999, 2014.
[21] P. Holme and N. Masuda. The basic reproduction number as a
predictor for epidemic outbreaks in temporal networks. PLoS
ONE, 10(3):e0120567, 03 2015.
[22] P. Holme and J. Sarama¨ki. Temporal networks. Physics Re-
ports, 519(3):97–125, 2012.
[23] L. Isella, J. Stehle´, A. Barrat, C. Cattuto, J. F. Pinton, and
W. van den Broeck. What’s in a crowd? Analysis of face-to-
face behavioral networks. J. Theor. Biol., 271:166–180, 2011.
[24] F. Karimi, V. C. Ramenzoni, and P. Holme. Structural dif-
ferences between open and direct communication in an online
community. Physica A, 414:263273, 2014.
[25] M. Karsai, M. Kivela¨, R. K. Pan, K. Kaski, J. Kerte´sz, A.-L.
Baraba´si, and J. Sarama¨ki. Small but slow world: How network
topology and burstiness slow down spreading. Phys. Rev. E,
83:025102, 2011.
[26] M. J. Keeling and K. T. Eames. Networks and epidemic models.
Journal of the Royal Society Interface, 2(4):295–307, 2005.
[27] M. C. Kiti, M. Tizzoni, T. M. Kinyanjui, D. C. Koech, P. K.
Munywoki, M. Meriac, L. Cappa, A. Panisson, A. Barrat,
C. Cattuto, and D. J. Nokes. Quantifying social contacts in a
household setting of rural kenya using wearable proximity sen-
sors. EPJ Data Science, 5(1):21, 2016.
[28] O. Krylova and D. J. D. Earn. Effects of the infectious period
distribution on predicted transitions in childhood disease dy-
namics. Journal of The Royal Society Interface, 10(84), 2013.
[29] J. Laherre`re and D. Sornette. Stretched exponential distribu-
tions in nature and economy: “fat tails” with characteristic
12
scales. Eur. Phys. J. B, 2(4):525–539, 1998.
[30] S. Lee, L. E. C. Rocha, F. Liljeros, and P. Holme. Exploiting
temporal network structures of human interaction to effectively
immunize populations. PLoS ONE, 44:e36439, 2012.
[31] R. Mastrandrea, J. Fournet, and A. Barrat. Contact patterns
in a high school: A comparison between data collected using
wearable sensors, contact diaries and friendship surveys. PLOS
ONE, 10(9):1–26, 09 2015.
[32] N. Masuda and P. Holme. Predicting and controlling infectious
disease epidemics using temporal networks. F1000Prime Rep.,
5:6, 2015.
[33] N. Masuda and R. Lambiotte. A guide to temporal networks.
World Scientific, Singapore, 2016.
[34] R. Michalski, S. Palus, and P. Kazienko. Matching organiza-
tional structure and social network extracted from email com-
munication. In Lecture Notes in Business Information Process-
ing, volume 87, pages 197–206. Springer Berlin Heidelberg,
2011.
[35] B. Min, K.-I. Goh, and A. Vazquez. Spreading dynamics fol-
lowing bursty human activity patterns. Phys. Rev. E, 83:036102,
Mar 2011.
[36] M. E. J. Newman. Networks: An Introduction. Oxford Univer-
sity Press, Oxford, 2010.
[37] M. E. J. Newman and J. Park. Why social networks are different
from other types of networks. Phys. Rev. E, 68:036122, Sep
2003.
[38] J.-P. Onnela, J. Sarama¨ki, J. Hyvo¨nen, G. Szabo´, D. Lazer,
K. Kaski, J. Kerte´sz, and A.-L. Baraba´si. Structure and tie
strengths in mobile communication networks. Proceedings of
the National Academy of Sciences, 104(18):7332–7336, 2007.
[39] P. Panzarasa, T. Opsahl, and K. M. Carley. Patterns and dynam-
ics of users’ behavior and interaction: Network analysis of an
online community. J. Am. Soc. Inf. Sci. Technol., 60(5):911–
932, May 2009.
[40] A. Paranjape, A. R. Benson, and J. Leskovec. Motifs in tem-
poral networks. In Proceedings of the Tenth ACM Interna-
tional Conference on Web Search and Data Mining, WSDM
’17, pages 601–610, New York, NY, USA, 2017. ACM.
[41] M. Radu-Corneliu, D. Ciprian, and X. Fatos. Exploring pre-
dictability in mobile interaction. In Third International Con-
ference on Emerging Intelligent Data and Web Technologies,
pages 133–139, Piscataway NJ, USA, 2012. IEEE Computer
Society.
[42] J. M. Read, K. T. D. Eames, and W. J. Edmunds. Dynamic
social networks and the implications for the spread of infectious
disease. Journal of The Royal Society Interface, 5(26):1001–
1007, 2008.
[43] L. E. C. Rocha and V. D. Blondel. Bursts of vertex activation
and epidemics in evolving networks. PLOS Computational Bi-
ology, 9(3):1–9, 03 2013.
[44] L. E. C. Rocha, F. Liljeros, and P. Holme. Information dynam-
ics shape the sexual networks of internet-mediated prostitution.
Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA, 107:5706–5711, 2010.
[45] M. Salathe´, M. Kazandjieva, J. W. Lee, P. Levis, M. W. Feld-
man, and J. H. Jones. A high-resolution human contact network
for infectious disease transmission. Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences, 107(51):22020–22025, 2010.
[46] J. Stehle´, N. Voirin, A. Barrat, C. Cattuto, L. Isella, J.-F. Pin-
ton, M. Quaggiotto, W. van den Broeck, C. Re´gis, B. Lina, and
P. Vanhems. High-resolution measurements of face-to-face con-
tact patterns in a primary school. PLoS ONE, 6:e23176, 2011.
[47] A. Stopczynski, V. Sekara, P. Sapiezynski, A. Cuttone, J. E.
Larsen, and S. Lehmann. Measuring large-scale social networks
with high resolution. PLOS ONE, 9(4):e95978, 2014.
[48] W. van den Broeck, M. Quaggiotto, L. Isella, A. Barrat, and
C. Cattuto. The making of sixty-nine days of close encounters
at The Science Gallery. Leonardo, 45:201–202, 2012.
[49] P. Vanhems, A. Barrat, C. Cattuto, J.-F. Pinton, N. Khanafer,
C. Re´gis, B.-A. Kim, B. Comte, and N. Voirin. Estimating
potential infection transmission routes in hospital wards using
wearable proximity sensors. PLoS ONE, 8:e73970, 2013.
[50] B. Viswanath, A. Mislove, M. Cha, and K. P. Gummadi. On
the evolution of user interaction in Facebook. In Proceedings
of the 2Nd ACM Workshop on Online Social Networks, WOSN
’09, pages 37–42, New York, NY, USA, 2009. ACM.
[51] E. M. Volz, J. C. Miller, A. Galvani, and L. Ancel Meyers. Ef-
fects of heterogeneous and clustered contact patterns on infec-
tious disease dynamics. PLOS Computational Biology, 7(6):1–
13, 06 2011.
[52] Y.-Q. Zhang, X. Li, J. Xu, and A. Vasilakos. Human interactive
patterns in temporal networks. IEEE Trans. Syst. Man Cybern.,
45(2):214–222, Feb 2015.
